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JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO
WITHHOLD DISCLOSURE OF INFORMANT'S
IDENTITY: STATE v. ROBINSON
Law enforcement, however, in defeating the criminal, must main-
tain inviolate the historic liberties of the individual. To turn back the
criminal, yet by doing so, destroy the dignity of the individual,
would be a hollow victory.
J. Edgar Hoover
1
In State v. Robinson2 the defendants were indicted for conspiracy
to traffic in heroin, for possession of heroin, for possession of heroin
with intent to distribute, and for trafficking in heroin. The defense
moved for disclosure of a confidential informant who was a witness
to and a participant in the two transactions which resulted in the
charges. During an in camera hearing held pursuant to Rule 5 1 0(c)(2)
of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence3 the trial judge determined
that, although the informant was a participant, his testimony would
not be relevant or helpful to the defendants or necessary to a fair
determination of their guilt or innocence, and therefore denied the
defendant's pretrial motion for disclosure.4
1. Hoover, Civil Liberties and Law Enforcement: The Role of the F.B.L, 37 Iowa L. Rev.
175,177 (1952).
2. 89 N.M. 199, 549 P.2d 277 (1976).
3. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-510(c)(2) (Supp. 1976):
Testimony on Merits. If it appears from the evidence in the case or from other
showing by a party that an informer will be able to give testimony that is
relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused or is necessary to a fair
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence in a criminal case or of a
material issue on the merits in a civil case to which the state or a subdivision
thereof is a party, and the state or subdivision thereof invokes the privilege,
the judge shall give the state or subdivision thereof an opportunity to show in
camera facts relevant to determining whether the informer can, in fact, supply
that testimony. The showing will ordinarily be in the form of affidavits, but
the judge may direct that testimony be taken if he finds that the matter
cannot be resolved satisfactorily upon affidavit. If the judge finds that there is
a reasonable probability that the informer can give the testimony, and the
state or subdivision thereof elects not to disclose his identity, the judge on
motion of the defendant in a criminal case shall dismiss the charges to which
the testimony would relate, and the judge may do so on his own motion. In
civil cases, he may make any order that justice requires. Evidence submitted to
the judge shall be sealed and preserved to be made available to the appellate
court in the event of an appeal, and the contents shall not otherwise be
revealed without an order of the court. All counsel shall be permitted to be
present at any stage at which counsel for any party is permitted to be present.
4. 89 N.M. 199, -, 549 P.2d 277, 277 (1976).
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The New Mexico Court of Appeals heard the case on interlocutory
appeal and reversed the order of the trial court.' The New Mexico
Supreme Court then heard the case on certiorari requested by the
State and reinstated the trial court's order.6
This case raises the question of when Rule 5 10(c)(2) of the New
Mexico Rules of Evidence' permits the trial court, after an in camera
hearing, to deny the defendant's motion for disclosure of a confiden-
tial informant. Specifically, does Rule 510 give the trial court dis-
cretion to deny the motion for disclosure even though it has been
determined that the informant was a participant in and therefore a
material witness to the illegal activity which resulted in the arrest and
his testimony is being sought for a trial on the merits?
The charges resulted from incidents occurring on two different
days. According to the police reports the first incident took place on
August 29, 1974 when a police agent and an confidential informant
drove to a Dairy Queen store in Albuquerque. The informant intro-
duced the officer to one of the defendants and the officer asked the
defendant if he could obtain an ounce of heroin from him. They
were soon joined by a second man, a co-defendant, who said he
could arrange to obtain the heroin.
The officer and the informant then left, ostensibly to get the
necessary money, but in fact to alert a surveillance team. They re-
turned about twenty minutes later at which time the third, fourth
and fifth co-defendants joined them. Using two cars, they all drove
to a nearby Circle K store where the officer gave the money to one
defendant who then made a telephone call out of the hearing of the
officer and the informant. After the telephone call both cars drove to
a house where the transaction took place. All the defendants injected
the heroin in the presence of the officer and the informant. The
informant was present during all the negotiations and saw the actual
transfer of money for heroin.
The second incident took place on September 17, 1974 when the
same officer and the same informant arrived at the Dairy Queen in
the informant's car. They made arrangements with a group of people
5. State v. Robinson, 14 N.M. St. B. Bull. 1147, 1148 (Ct. App. February 19, 1976). The
Court of Appeals decision has not been reported under the New Mexico Supreme Court's
discretionary power to decide which cases will be published. Telephone interview with Ms.
Rose Marie Alderette, Clerk of the New Mexico Supreme Court, October 8, 1976. The same
case was originally heard by the New Mexico Court of Appeals on July 9, 1975. 14 N.M. St.
B. Bull. 834. No transcript has been prepared of the in camera hearing. The case was
remanded instructing that another in camera hearing be held and a record made for con-
sideration by the Court of Appeals.
6. 89 N.M. 199, -, 549 P.2d 277, 281 (1976). As of this writing the trial on the
merits has not been scheduled.
7. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-510(c)(2) (Supp. 1976).
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including some of the defendants from the first transaction.8 Again,
the informant saw the exchange of money for heroin and was a
participant in the events leading to the arrest.
RULE 510(c)(2)
Rule 5 1 0(c)(2) of the New Mexico Rules of Evidence states:
If it appears from the evidence in the case or from other showing by
a party that an informer will be able to give testimony that is rele-
vant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is necessary to a
fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence in a criminal
case ... and the state or subdivision thereof invokes the privilege,
the judge shall give the state or subdivision thereof an opportunity
to show in camera facts relevant to determining whether the in-
former can, in fact, supply the testimony .... If the judge finds that
there is a reasonable probability that the informer can give the testi-
mony, and the state or subdivision thereof elects not to disclose his
identity, the judge on motion of the defendant in a criminal case
shall dismiss the charges to which the testimony would relate, and
the judge may do so on his own motion.. 9
By denying disclosure in Robinson, the New Mexico Supreme
Court has construed Rule 510(c)(2) to mean that even if a court
determines that the confidential informant is a material witness, and
that his testimony would be material in a trial on the merits, it
nonetheless has the discretion to subsequently rule that he need not
testify.
This construction ignores the important distinctions between a
material witness and a nonmaterial witness and between a hearing
and a trial on the merits. Under this construction of the Rule, it
makes no difference whether the informant is a participant in the
illegal activity or merely a "tipster"; it makes no difference whether
the testimony is requested for a trial on the merits or for a pretrial
motion hearing. These are not idle distinctions. First, informants
frequently provide the police with "tips" concerning when and
where to find illegal activity. However, the informant himself is no-
where near the scene of the activity, does not participate in the
actual illegal transactions and cannot identify the defendants. He is
not a material witness.' 0 Secondly, the information supplied by the
8. State v. Robinson, 14 N.M. St. B. Bull. 1147-1148 (Ct. App. February 19, 1976).
There was no testimony regarding the second incident during the in camera hearing although
all the defendants were indicted for offenses stemming from it also. It is not clear, however,
whether all the original defendants were present during the second incident.
9. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-510(c)(2) (Supp. 1976).
10. In McLawhorn v. North Carolina, 484 F.2d 1, 5 (4th Cir. 1973), the court analyzed
this distinction:
Summer 1977]
NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW
informant may provide the probable cause for a search warrant and
thus his testimony may be requested by the defense at a motion to
suppress evidence. The leading case is McCray v. Illinois. I I This case
involved a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress evidence found
on the defendant after an informant told the police the defendant
would have narcotics on him. In denying disclosure the Court said:
We must remember also that we are not dealing with the trial of
the criminal charge itself. There the need for a truthful verdict out-
weighs society's need for the informer privilege.' 2
The New Mexico Supreme Court decision blatantly ignores the
Rule's statement of these distinctions between a tipster and a partici-
pant and between a pretrial hearing and a trial on the merits:
If the judge finds that there is a reasonable probability that the
informer can give the testimony, and the state or subdivision thereof
elects not to disclose his identity, the judge on motion of the
defendant in a criminal case shall dismiss the charges .... 3
"The testimony" obviously refers to the previous sentence in the
Rule, "testimony that is relevant and helpful to the defense of an
accused or is necessary to a fair determination of the issue of guilt or
innocence."' ' A tipster might or might not have testimony that is
relevant and helpful to the defense and he might or might not have
testimony that is necessary to a fair determination of guilt or inno-
cence; a participant might or might not have testimony that is rele-
vant and helpful to the defense but, as a material witness, he would
quite obviously have testimony that is necessary to a fair determina-
tion of guilt or innocence. An informer's testimony during a pretrial
motion hearing may or may not be relevant and helpful to the de-
fense but a motion hearing does not determine issues of guilt or
innocence; a trial does.
In determining whether invocation of the privilege of nondisclosure is to be
sustained a distinction has frequently been made based on the nature of the
informant's activities, that is, whether the informant is an active participant in
the offense or is a mere tipster who supplies a lead to law enforcement officers
to be pursued in this investigation of crime. Applying this distinction, dis-
closure of the informant's identity is required where the informant is an actual
participant, particularly where he helps set up the crime occurrence (emphasis
added).
See also People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d 163, 313 N.E.2d 41, 356 N.Y.S.2d 571 (1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 262, 287-290 (1961) and Supp. at 434
(1975).
11. 386 U.S. 300 (1967).
12. Id. at 307.
13. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 20-4-510(c)(2) (Supp. 1976).
14. Id.
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The New Mexico Supreme Court viewed the informant's testi-
mony in light of the other testimony it anticipated would be intro-
duced in the case and concluded that the informant would be a
consistent witness for the state.
In the case before us the informant in his testimony in the in camera
hearing did not contradict nor vary the police offense reports which
were made part of the record in the case before the Court of Ap-
peals.1 "
This statement by the New Mexico Court appears to ignore the
language in the Rule which very clearly sets the criteria for dis-
closure. If the testimony is relevant and helpful to the defense,
disclosure must follow. If the testimony is not, then if it is necessary
to a fair determination of guilt or innocence disclosure also must
follow. A witness who does not contradict police offense reports
may have testimony only relevant to the guilt of the defendants but,
according to Rule 5 10, such testimony by a participant must be
disclosed if requested by the defense. It must be disclosed because
the testimony of material witnesses is necessary to a fair determina-
tion of guilt or innocence. Since the Rule applies to both guilt and
innocence the emphasis must properly be on the word "fair." To
deny disclosure of a material witness who participated in the
allegedly illegal transactions seriously impedes the adversary process
the purpose of which is the fair determination of guilt or innocence.
ROVIARO v. UNITED STATES
In order to construe Rule 510 as it has done, the New Mexico
Court was forced to justify its argument in the face of the holding in
Roviaro v. United States,"6 the last definitive word on this issue
from the United States Supreme Court. Roviaro was also a drug case
involving an informant who bought narcotics from the defendant
while a police agent hid in the trunk of the car, watching and listen-
ing to the whole transaction.' ' The Court in Roviaro required dis-
closure and laid the ground rules for the limits of privilege in the
Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence. New Mexico's Rule 510 was
taken almost verbatim from the Proposed Federal Rule.' "
15. 89 N.M. 199, -, 549 P.2d 277, 279 (1976).
16. 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
17. Id. at 57.
18. The advisory Committee Note to that Rule says:
... (2) The informer privilege, it was held by the leading case, [Roviaro] may
not be used in a criminal prosecution to suppress the identity of a witness
when the public interest in protecting the flow of information is outweighed
by the individual's right to prepare his defense.
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Where the disclosure of an informer's identity, or of the contents of
his communication, is relevant and helpful to the defense of an
accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a case, the privilege
must give way (emphasis added).'"
The New Mexico Supreme Court chose to ignore this language in
Roviaro, as it ignored the same language in Rule 510. Instead it
isolated one paragraph of dicta in the Roviaro decision which "calls
for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of informa-
tion against the indvidual's right to prepare his defense. Whether a
proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the
"12 0particular circumstances of each case....
The New Mexico Supreme Court then proceeded to distinguish
Roviaro on the basis of the facts: The Court said that in Roviaro the
informant was the sole nondefendant involved, ignoring the fact that
a police officer was secreted in the trunk of the car where he saw and
heard the whole transaction. 2 ' In Robinson the police officer and
the informant both actively engaged in the transaction with the
defendants.2 2 On the basis of this extremely tenuous distinction the
Court concluded that the facts were different in the two cases and
therefore the disclosure in Roviaro was not applicable to the present
case. If disclosure or nondisclosure is to be determined by this dis-
tinction there is a serious possibility of police perjury to fit the facts
to Robinson. It is all too easy for the police officer to testify that the
drugs were sold to him rather than to the informer and, with the
informer silent, there may be no way to impeach his testimony. It
should also be noted, as it was in Roviaro, that the informer would
be the only nonpolice witness should the defendants invoke their
rights not to testify 23 and the one witness who could amplify or
Congress did not adopt any of the proposed evidentiary privilege rules including Rule 510.
Instead, Congress substituted Rule 501 in the Federal Rules of Evidence:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, govern-
ment, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles
of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience....
19. 353 U.S. at 60-61. See also Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 262, 282 (1961) and Supp. at 429
(1975).
20. 353 U.S. at 62.
21. Id. at 57.
22. 89 N.M. at ,549 P.2d at 279.
23. "Unless petitioner waived his constitutional right not to take the stand in his own
defense, John Doe [the informant] was his one material witness." 353 U.S. at 64.
See also Commonwealth v. Carter, 427 Pa. 53, 233 A.2d 284 (1967), where the court in
requiring disclosure notes that the informer is the only material witness to the transaction
besides the police and the defendant.
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contradict the testimony of the police. 24 This is precisely the case in
Robinson.
Since Roviaro, other courts in considering the issue of disclosure,
have concluded that an informant who was a participant must be
disclosed as a material witness. In Gilmore v. United States2 s the
informant pointed out the defendant to the police agent and watched
as a narcotics transaction took place. In holding that disclosure was
required, the court stated:
Anonymous was a principal actor before and during this per-
formance, who he was and what he knew was certainly material and
relevant. In this testimony there might have been seeds of innocence,
of substantial doubt, or overwhelming corroboration. As the infer-
ences from it covered the full spectrum from innocence to guilt, the
process of truth-finding, which should be the aim of every trial,
compelled its disclosure. 2 6
RULE 510 AND THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
The New Mexico Court has put the trial judge in a rather peculiar
position. While deciding whether or not the informant's testimony
will be helpful to the defense, he is simultaneously deciding whether
or not the informant's testimony is necessary for a fair determination
of the guilt or innocence of the defendant, whether or not the state's
interest in protecting the informant is being served, and whether or
not the informant is a credible witness.2 7 The judge plays all the
24. 353 U.S. at 64.
25. 256 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1958).
26. Id. at 567. See also United States v. Martinez, 487 F.2d 973 (10th Cir. 1973);
Lopez-Hernandez v. United States, 394 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1968); Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 262,
287-290 (1961) and Supp. at 434 (1975).
27.
Our evidentiary Rule 510 provides a systematic method for balancing the
state's interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual's
right to prepare his defense. It gives the trial court the opportunity to deter-
mine through an in camera hearing whether the identify of the informer must
be disclosed or not. Where it appears that the informer's testimony will be
relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or necessary to a fair
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence, then the trial judge can order
the state to either reveal the identity of the informer or suffer a dismissal of
the charges to which the testimony would relate. On the other hand, where it
appears to the trial judge from the evidence that the informer's testimony will
not be relevant and helpful to an accused's defense, or necessary to a fair
determination of the issue of guilt or innocence, then the identity of the
informer can remain undisclosed, and that person is not exposed unnecessarily
to the highly dangerous position of being a known informant. Our only con-
cern upon appellate review of the trial court's determination is to insure that it
did not abuse its discretion in this matter.
89 N.M. at -, 549 P.2d at 279-80.
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parts in the scenario. He is judge; he is counsel for the defense; he is
prosecutor; he is jury. The judge also directs the action by asking all
the questions and as a final triumph he does not even allow an
audience!
If Roviaro and Rule 5 10 are to be interpreted this way, our adver-
sary system of justice in situations of this type is virtually destroyed.
If relevancy is to be determined by whether or not one witness will
contradict another, why have a trial in the first place? Why have a
right to cross examination if witnesses who might be impeached need
never be produced? Why have a right to counsel if the defense cannot
choose which witnesses will be helpful to its case? Why have a jury
trial if the jury is denied the opportunity to weigh the credibility of
witnesses?
The Sixth Amendment guarantees of the right to confront one's
accusers, the right to obtain witnesses in one's favor and the right to
assistance of counsel are basic elements of due process required in all
criminal trials.2 8 "In short, the Amendment constitutionalizes the
right in an adversary criminal trial to make a defense as we know
it."2 In order to "make a defense" the defendant and his attorney-
not the judge or the state-must decide which witnesses will be help-
ful. 0° The defense must be afforded the opportunity to test the
credibility of witnesses in front of the jury. Otherwise, notwith-
standing the clear and definitive requirements of the Sixth Amend-
ment, the possibilities for police abuse are enormous. What is the
relationship between the informer and the police? Why is he an
informer? 3 ' What, if anything, was he promised in exchange for his
testimony?3 2 "It is not unknown for the arresting officer to mis-
28. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confronta-
tion); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (right to witnesses); Gideon v. Wainright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel).
29. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818 (1975).
30.
The desirability of calling John Doe [the informant] as a witness, or at least
interviewing him in preparation for trial, was a matter for the accused rather
than the government to decide.
353 U.S. at 64.
Under an adversary system of justice, each side is uniquely suited to determine
whether the testimony of a particular witness will advance its cause.
Commonwealth v. Carter, 427 Pa. 53, , 233 A.2d 284, 290 (1967).
[1] t is unfair to refuse to afford a defendant the opportunity of deciding for
himself whether or not the informer could provide testimony helpful to the
defense. To deny access to the informer in such circumstances is to deny a
defendant his sixth amendment rights as established by Roviaro.
People v. Lewis, 57 1ll.2d 232, , 311 N.E.2d 685, 688 (1974).
31. "The informer's reasons for being an informer are unclear from the record." State v.
Robinson, 14 N.M. St. B. Bull. 1147-1148 (Ct. App. February 19, 1976).
32. The possible bias of a witness is always relevant to his credibility. See Davis v. Alaska,
415 U.S. 308 (1974); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
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represent his connection with the informer, [or] his knowledge of
the informer's reliability. ... " 3 An informer who did not contra-
dict police offense reports while testifying during an in camera hear-
ing has not weathered the intense scrutiny of cross examination. 3 1
The safeguards of a full adversary trial cannot be reduced merely
because the law is a difficult one to enforce. The New Mexico
Court's concern in Robinson that forcing the state to reveal the
informer's identity in narcotics cases would "unreasonably cripple
the state's efforts at drug law enforcement"' 3 I was misplaced. It is
true that drug cases involve peculiar problems because there are often
no "victims," at least none with an interest in prosecuting. The re-
quirements of due process cannot be made to depend on the diffi-
culty of enforcing certain laws. This was well stated by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Carter:
[W] e find it impossible to accept the contention that the peculiar
problems surrounding enforcement of the narcotics laws should play
a part in our determination of the scope of the prosecution's duty to
disclose to the defense the identify of material eyewitnesses having
knowledge of facts crucial to guilt or innocence.3 6
California has also adopted an in camera hearing provision with
respect to disclosure of informants. 3 ' However, the California cases
consistently hold that the in camera hearing allows the judge to
determine only whether or not the informant is a material witness.
The in camera court can probe no further; if the informer is a mate-
rial witness, disclosure must follow.
Where the evidence indicates that the informer was an actual partici-
pant in the crime alleged, or was a non-participating eyewitness to
that offense, ipso facto it is held he would be a material witness on
33. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 316 n. 2 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
34.
Petitioner's opportunity to cross-examine Police Officer Bryson and Federal
Narcotics Agent Durham was hardly a substitute for an opportunity to ex-
amine the man who had been nearest to him and took part in the transaction.
Doe had helped to set up the criminal occurrence and had played a prominent
part in it. His testimony might have disclosed an entrapment.
353 U.S. at 64.
Although not raised in Robinson, entrapment is frequently a defense in drug cases where
the informants have arranged the meetings or introduced the police agents to the de-
fendants. With the informant silent, obviously this defense cannot be pursued. See also
Lopez-Hernandez v. United States, 394 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1968); Jones v. United States,
266 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir. 1959
35. 89 N.M. at , 549 P.2d at 279.
36. 427 Pa. 53, , 233 A.2d 284, 289 (1967).
37. Cal. Ann. Evid. Code § 1042(d)(West Supp. 1976).
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the issue of guilt and nondisclosure would deprive the defendant of a
fair trial.3 8
New Jersey, Kansas and Wisconsin also have in camera provisions
regarding the informant privilege.3 9 Cases in those states support the
contention that Roviaro and the Sixth Amendment require dis-
closure whenever the informer is a material witness. 4"
CONCLUSION
The New Mexico Supreme Court has construed Rule 5 10 of the
New Mexico Rules of Evidence in Robinson to permit the trial judge,
in camera, to determine the State's interest, the defense's interest
and the relevance of an informer's testimony even after the facts
have revealed that the informer was a participant in the illegal activ-
ity and, therefore, a material witness. This construction cannot be
squared with the constitutional requirements of the Sixth Amend-
ment or with Roviaro, the leading United States Supreme Court case
on the issue of the informant privilege.
It must be emphatically stated that there is no mention of an in
camera hearing in Roviaro. Instead the Court unequivocally says:
"the privilege must give way."' ' The in camera hearing, then, must
be limited to a determination of whether the informant was a par-
ticipant, or, if not, whether his testimony would be helpful to the
defense. If the court determines that the informant was a participant,
his identity must be disclosed. Nothing less will satisfy the rigors of
American criminal justice.
NANCY HOLLANDER
38. Williams v. Superior Court for the County of San Joaquin, 38 Cal. App.3d 412, 420,
112 Cal. Rptr. 485, 485 (1975 See also People v. Goliday, 8 Cal.3d 771, 505 P.2d 537,
106 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1973).
39. Kan. Civ. Pro. Stat. Ann. § 60-436 (Vernon 1965); N.J. Stat. § 2A:84A-28 (Supp.
1974); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 905.10(1) (Spec. Pamphlet 1974).
40. State v. Deffenbaugh, 216 Kan. 593, 533 P.2d 1328 (1975); State v. Oliver, 50 N.J.
39, 231 A.2d 805 (1967); State v. Midell, 40 Wis.2d 516, 162 N.W.2d 54 (1968).
41. 353 U.S. at 61. Some courts have interpreted Roviaro to require full disclosure
without an in camera hearing anytime there is a trial on the merits and the informant can
provide relevant testimony on the issue of guilt or innocence:
When, however, as in the case at bar the defendant's guilt or innocence is at
issue, the decision as to whether the informant's identity should be disclosed
must not be resolved in an ex parte proceeding (emphasis added).
People v. Goggins, 34 N.Y.2d 163,169, 313 N.E.2d 41, 44, 356 N.Y.S.2d 571, 575 (1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1012 (1974).
See also, Note, Disclosure of an Informant's Identity-The Substantive and Procedural
Balance Tests, 39 Albany L. Rev. 561, 570 (1975).
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